Abstract-In this paper, we propose a new protocol to allow delegation transfer between offline mobile readers in the mobile RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) environment. A mobile reader can grant the access rights of a specific tag to another reader. Besides, our protocol is efficient and secure against most current network threats, such as replay attacks, Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks, denial of service (DoS) attacks caused by asynchronous update, guessing attacks, and counterfeit tags. It also guarantees forward/backward secrecy, data privacy, and location privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Radio frequency identification (RFID) has been widely applied in logistics management, entrance control, smart appliances, medical control, and e-wallet services. An RFID framework consists of back-end servers, database, RFID readers, and tags. RFID tags include active tags and passive tags. An active RFID tag contains a battery, and a passive tag is powered by radio wave energy from an RFID reader. Most RFID tags used in supply chains are passive ones. Because of the limitation of power consuming and gate counts, a passive RFID tag can only do simple computation and have limited storage capacity. Most of its data is stored on the back-end database servers.
In recent years RFID technology has seen the integration of RFID and mobile devices [2] [7] [8] . An RFID-embedded cellphone can access a tag and retrieve its data from the back-end server through wireless or 3G networks [14] .
In a mobile RFID environment, even though a mobile reader can communicate with its back-end server through telecommunications, weak reception or poor network quality can usually affect its performance [3] [4] [5] [9] [11] [15] . Among RFID's research, offline delegation transfer allows users who have been authorized to access a specific tag to transfer a part of their authorization to others without Internet connections [1] [10] [12] [16] . To perform offline delegation, a back-end server has to delegate authority of a specific RFID tag to an RFID reader, and the delegated reader is allowed to access a specific tag in the future even in an offline environment [10] [14] [16] .
Fouladgar et al. [5] propose an online delegation and ownership transfer protocol. Lee et al.'s scheme [9] uses timestamps to manage authorization, but in Lee's protocol, if one user updates a tag's timestamp, others will have to use the new timestamp to access the tag. When a tag reaches its maximum timestamp update times, all the delegated readers have to connect to their back-end server for new delegation. Yang [15] also proposes an offline delegation protocol that stores an access control list (ACL) on a tag to limit a reader's access right. He also deploys timestamps in his offline delegation scheme. His back-end server can delegate the access right to a tag, but the access right cannot be transferred from one reader to another.
For these reasons, we propose a new scheme to perform offline delegation transfer. In our protocol, the delegation of a specific tag is within control. A mobile RFID reader is allowed limited access times of a specific tag by its back-end server. The tag can verify and decrease the access counter in each access. After the counter expires, the reader has to request a new delegation from the back-end server. The other reader can request delegation from the reader that owns the tag. A delegation transfer is operated offline without the involvement of the back-end server. After the delegation transfer, the access times of the tag are transferred to the new reader, and the access counter of the previous reader decreases by the same amount. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 details our proposed protocol; section 3 analyzes the security issues; section 4 deals with performance evaluation and comparison; section 5 concludes our scheme.
II. OFFLINE DELEGATION PROTOCOL
Our offline delegation transfer protocol includes an initial stage and three protocols: (1) offline reader-tag mutual authentication protocol; (2) readers' delegation protocol and (3) offline delegation transfer protocol, as shown in Figure 1 . At the initial stage, mobile readers have been delegated authority to a specific tag and authenticate each other. In the second part, the readers identify and access the tag offline. In the third part a reader delegate his access rights to another reader. Notations uses in this paper are listed in Table 1 . 
A. Initial Stage
In the initial stage, when an RFID reader i wants to access a tag, it should send a delegation request to the back-end server, and the server will return a tag-list that contains all the tags owned by the reader, see Figure 2 . The server randomly generates a session key and a nonce . After concatenating , and , and generate the session key , a delegation message contains reader's and tag's identifiers, system's timestamp , session key , and reader's maximum query times . Then the server sends to the reader.
B. Offline Reader-Tag Mutual Authentication Protocol
After a reader gets the access right of a specific tag from the back-end server, the reader and the tag should do mutual authentication to identify each other, which is performed offline. Figure 3 details the steps of our reader-tag mutual authentication. Step 1: Reader i sends a request message to tag m, along with its own identifier , a nonce , and a delegation message .
Step Step 3: When receiving , reader i derives and and compare them to and .
C. Reader's Delegation Protocol
In our protocol, the delegation of a specific tag is limited. Each time when a reader accesses a tag, a counter decrease. After the counter expires, the reader has to 1.offline authentication 2.offline reading
1.offline authentication

3.offline delegation transfer
Reader RIDj Step 1: Reader i constructs by using to encrypt and a random number . Then it sends , its own identifier , and M 2 to the tag m. 
D. Offline Delegation Transfer Protocol
In our offline delegation transfer protocol, the access right of a reader can be transferred to another reader through tag m's authorization. For example, the initial query times of readers i and j are 3 and 18 respectively, i.e. and . Reader j uses the offline delegation transfer protocol to transfer 10 query times to reader i; at last the query time of reader i and j are 13 and 8 respectively, i.e. and , see Figure 5 .
Our offline delegation transfer requires a tag and two mobile readers (one to request delegation transfer, the other to transfer authorized query times). Both reader i and reader j have to be delegated authority in advance to access tag m. We assume that reader i has run out of its delegated query times. It needs to request delegation transfer from reader j, so that it can acquire some extra query times to access the tag. One particular requirement in our delegation transfer is that the transfer must be performed under the same timestamp. Only in doing so can tag m have full record of all delegated readers' information. This requirement also empowers our back-end server to use timestamps to restrict readers' delegated authority. Reader j provides tag m with the information required for delegation transfer. Once the tag approves the request, it will update its own access control list and then the transfer of delegation is done. The transfer includes 6 steps, as shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7 . Step 1: Reader i sends to reader j a transfer request , its own identifier , tag m's identifier , and requested query times .
Step 2: Reader j generates a delegation transfer request , and uses to encrypt , , and . Next it sends the encrypted message , the request , and its own identifier to tag m. , and offline delegation transfer is done. 
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Our protocol is designed to perform delegation transfer between offline readers. Without the involvement of back-end servers, we use timestamps and access control lists, e.g. and , to control readers' delegated authority. Apart from these, we deploy hash functions to generate keys, add random numbers into our messages, and use lightweight symmetric key encryption [6] [13] in our communications. All of these are intended to enhance our security and to lower the chance of attacks. Therefore, our security analysis will particularly focus on mutual authentication, replay attacks, MITM attacks, forward secrecy, backward secrecy, guessing attacks, location privacy, data privacy, and DoS attacks in asynchronous update.
A. Mutual Authentication
Our reader-tag communications are all encrypted with symmetric keys. Only with reader-tag shared keys, e.g. and , can the two decrypt each other's messages and hence authenticate each other. Even though adversaries intercept our delegation messages, their readers cannot pass our authentication because the messages contain delegated readers information. If they try to use an intercepted message to perform authentication, they do it simply for a legitimate reader whose identifier is in the message. Besides, without the keys they cannot even decrypt the intercepted messages.
B. Replay Attacks
Since we use nonce in our reader-tag communications, the messages will change in every session. Thus, attackers are unable to replay any legitimate messages to pass our authentication. However, during our offline mutual authentication, there is only one from a back-end server under the same timestamp. Here, malicious users may take this opportunity to replay reader i's message to tag m. But since tag m only stores the information in the first successful authentication, replayed messages are unable to change anything. Also, tag m's responses contain a nonce , which change in each communication. So, despite the possibility of replay attacks in this part, they cannot change anything.
C. MITM Attacks
First, our reader-tag messages are protected with encryption algorithms. Second, in our delegation transfer or when a delegated reader accesses a tag, the update of maximum query times requires the tag's reconfirmation with the delegated reader. Since adversaries are unable to launch replay attacks and they do not have or , they are unable to counterfeit tags or to launch MITM attacks, either.
D. Forward Secrecy
Because we use timestamps to control our delegated authority, once the timestamp is updated old delegation messages are all cleared. Old information will not be exposed to new users. Hence, forward secrecy is secured. 
E. Backward Secrecy
Our delegation message is protected by a session key . If Tag m wants to read the message, it needs to generate the key by hashing , and . Thus, even though attackers can obtain , they are unable to break because the session key is a hash value. Attackers cannot trace back the elements of a hash function from a hash value. Once changes in the next session, changes as well. Adversaries will not be able to track messages in following sessions. Hence, backward secrecy is secured.
F. Guessing Attacks
Though our communications are all secured with keys, malicious users may eavesdrop on our messages and then launch guessing attacks. Therefore, we use random numbers as responses when a reader or a tag fails to pass our authentication. This can effectively lower the chance of guessing attacks.
G. Location Privacy
Because we put random numbers in our communications, our messages change in each session. Despite eavesdropping, eavesdroppers cannot even tell whether the messages they overhear come from the same tag. So, they are unable to track our tags' location.
H. Data Privacy
Our delegation message is protected by and our reader-tag communications are secured with or . That is to say, without these keys, attackers can by no means pass our authentication and access our tags' data. Besides, since replay, MITM and guessing attacks cannot breach our protocol, we can say without a back-end server's authorization illegitimate reader are unable to access our tags. Hence, tags' data privacy is secured.
I. DoS Attacks
Our tag does not change its keys during reading, offline authentication, or offline delegation transfer. First, it acquires or from its back-end server's delegation messages. Then it runs a hash function to generate a session key . Therefore, there will be no asynchronous update of keys in our protocol. Still, asynchrony may occur when has been updated but is missing. and will stay the same. Nonetheless, such asynchrony can be fixed up in the next access. It will not affect our readers' reading or delegation transfer.
In Table 2 , we compare our protocol with other delegation protocols. It is obvious that our scheme is able to resist most network threats and is capable of delegation transfer. Compared with Fouladgar et al.'s protocol, our scheme achieves mutual authentication by securing our reader-tag communications with lightweight encryption algorithms. As mentioned above, our protocol is able to guarantee backward secrecy, which is impossible in Fouladgar et al.'s and Lee et al.'s schemes. The best part is that our protocol is the only one capable of offline delegation transfer in this comparison. Such ability makes delegation more useful and flexible in a mobile RFID environment. : the time to generate a random number. Table 3 depicts the detailed computation requirement for our reader and tag when we run the delegation scheme. If there are errors during the communications, the loads can even be lower. When errors occur, we only respond with a random number. No further en/decryption will be required. As for the target reader i, it only runs one lightweight encryption algorithm during delegation transfer. Therefore, we leave it out of our analysis. As shown in Table 3 , our use of random numbers in almost every action helps us prevent guessing attacks. Since our mutual authentication requires a tag to store the first legitimate delegation message, a delegated reader does not need to generate any random number for this action. It only needs one decryption. But a tag has to run a hash function to generate ; decrypt ; and encrypt . When a delegated reader access a tag, the two's computation loads are the same. The former needs two encryptions and one decryption and the latter one encryption and two decryptions. In offline delegation transfer, a tag has to encrypt for reader i, so its computation load is one encryption more than reader j's.
Next, we compare our scheme's computation load with that of other delegation protocols, as shown in Table 4 . For an offline reader, when it searches a tag's information in its authorization table, e.g. , the computation load should be taken into account. In Table 4 , we also assume that the information of a tag to be accessed must exist in the reader's authorization table. In the cases of multiple access, i.e. a reader being delegated authority to access multiple tags, we divide the reader's total computation loads by the number of tags. And we begin to count a tag's : the maximum value of a timestamp; : how many times a tag has been queried (a tag's counter in Lee et al.'s scheme); : a reader's current query times (a reader's counter in Yang's scheme);
: the maximum delegated query times.
As shown in Table 4 , we can find that it takes much computation for a reader to verify a tag's messages. And a tag's computation load varies from scheme to scheme and it is not affected by the number of delegated readers. Though Fouladgar et al.'s protocol [5] demands low computation for their reader and tag, their scheme is unable to perform reader-tag mutual authentication and therefore is vulnerable to certain network threats. The computation loads in Lee et al.'s approach [9] are highly influenced by their use of timestamps and by their key updating. Every time when Yang's tag receives a request from a reader, it has to compute a complex hash chain to generate a session key, so as to authenticate the reader. It gets worse in their first query because the tag also needs to add and into the computation. This has caused quite a burden for an RFID tag since it only has limited computing ability.
In our scheme, when under the same timestamp a reader needs to run two en/decryption algorithms if the reader-tag authentication fails; three en/decryption algorithms if the authentication is successful. Our reader's average computation load will not outweigh other schemes' readers. And our tag computes three en/decryption algorithms in both situations. Judging from the average computation loads, our proposed scheme has better performance in every aspect.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a delegation transfer protocol to allow offline readers to transfer their delegated authority to another authorized reader in the mobile RFID environment. Our protocol is also designed to secure against certain network threats, such as replay attacks, MITM attacks, DoS attacks in asynchronous update, counterfeit tags, and guessing attacks. It can guarantee forward/backward secrecy, data privacy, and data privacy.
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